An enraged Butler wrote to Sandys lacoste polo the day the St Pancras decision made the evening papers (15 April), informing his colleague that he had been concerned ‘at the construction that had been placed on [the crucial ‘no defence’ sentence] and its possible effect on the public’.17 He continued: ‘I had hoped that the wording we agreed for the para- graphs dealing with civil defence would have been sufficient to safe- guard the position, but even in the short time since the publication of the White Paper, it has become increasingly clear that this is not suf- ficient’. St Pancras was ‘the most extreme example of this’. What was more, the Metropolitan Borough called on other lacoste shirts authorities to do the same and impress upon the Government ‘the urgency of abolishing all atomic and hydrogen bombs as the only means of abolishing the wholesale slaughter of people in future wars’.18 Des- perate to restrict the malign influence of the ‘Communist-controlled’ council,19 Butler implored Sandys to stress the validity of civil defence and quash the ‘indefensible’ current of argument in the next day’s Commons defence debate; but although Sandys added a brief section on civil defence to his speech, he merely echoed the White Paper and failed to adequately expound Butler’s views. He did at least stress that ‘the nation’s available resources should be concentrated not on preparations to wage war so much as on trying to prevent this catastrophe lacoste tennis from ever happening’,20 but this hardly suited civil defence’s purpose. Butler himself swiftly moved to crush the St Pancras ‘rebellion’ in order to stop the ‘embarrassment’ of other local authorities following suit.21 But although the issue of St Pancras Council’s non-compliance was resolved swiftly, with a Commissioner being appointed to under- take the Council’s civil defence functions,22 it was an embarrassing episode which generated a deal of adverse publicity for the Government’s defence policy. Moreover, it seemed to immediately prove the validity of Home Office concerns regarding support for the government’s defence policy. Although a look at the press reaction should have placated the Home Secretary, as the Daily Telegraph and the News lacoste t shirts Chronicle gave ample space to critics of the St Pancras move,23 it was a grim warning of the future, as opponents lacoste sunglasses of the Conservative Government’s nuclear policy made use of its own published information to launch attacks – especially that single sentence in the Sandys White Paper. It recurred, in mutated form, as a terrible coda damning the Government’s policy, reaching its apotheosis early in 1958 when the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was formed in London. Its fingers burnt by the Sandys debacle, the lacoste shop online Government retreated from any further public pronouncements on the issue of nuclear war – a policy which it had followed for most of the 1950s. The first official booklet explaining the effects of thermonuclear weapons aimed at the general public was published only in 1957.24 These deep fears con- cerning public information reflected a broader culture of secrecy within Whitehall that proved remarkably pervasive. Yet there were also specific fears. The spectre of Coventry lacoste online store loomed large in these thermonuclear years. Gwilym Lloyd-George had been especially quick to suggest that any cut in civil defence provision would have dire consequences among the local authorities.25 Coventry’s actions went to the heart of the government nuclear posture – which argued that some defence could be mounted – and raised the prospect of an unwanted political battle over civil defence and nuclear war. Within Whitehall it seemed imperative to starve such opponents of the ammunition they needed – making the Sandys ‘admission’ deeply ironic. An illustrative example lacoste bag of this aversion to publicity was the treat- ment of a civil defence training manual, ‘Radioactive Fallout: Provisional Scheme of Public Control’. This outlined the scheme whereby the Civil Defence Services would control areas affected by fallout and rescue those stranded within them. It was a well thought-out document, which had been first drafted in June 1955, and had been placed on sale for civil defence units, but not the general public. Gwilym Lloyd-George had first attempted to get it published in November 1956 but the Cabinet rejected his plan for two reasons: that if it was published at that point it might be linked with threats of Soviet action during the Suez crisis; and that publication might have the effect of drawing lacoste sport attention to the inade- quacy of home defence preparations in general.26 In the new Administration four months later, Butler asked Macmillan to reconsider given that the Suez crisis was over, and the Medical Research Council had concurred with the content of the report.27 Also, as to leading to some sort of pro-civil defence spending clamour, Butler argued that ‘past experience suggests that publication is unlikely to occasion any such public response. In fact the less we are able to make large scale phys- ical chemise lacoste preparations for home defence the greater becomes the need to show that we are continuing to prepare realistic plans for making the best use of what we can do’. For Butler,lacoste boots there was a great need to publish the doc- ument (it had also been foreshadowed in the 1956 White Paper): ‘if home defence is to have any meaning a programme of public education of the threat of radioactive fallout is essential. It is a clear duty of the Government to make the facts of nuclear attack known and to give guid- ance on the kind of plans required to meet the new threat’.28 Butler was rebuffed, and rebuffed once more when he tried again a month later.29 He tried a third time in August, and told Macmillan that declassifying the scheme ‘would allow us, as opportunity offers, to take credit for a piece of realistic planning, which would provide some answer to the criticisms we constantly face of failing to bring civil defence up to date in relation to the conditions of nuclear warfare’.30 Yet still Macmillan resisted.31 When Butler tried for the fourth time, in December 1958, after the local authorities had pressed him lacoste outlet online to publish it, Macmillan relented.32 This was a farcical state of affairs. As Butler pointed out, the memo- randum was a rare example of a realistic and effective civil defence plan ready to put into action. Moreover, the Medical Research Council’s inves- tigation into The Hazards to Man of Nuclear and Allied Radiations had excited little publicity when published in 1956.33 Macmillan was too scared of the consequences to publish it, an understandable if misguided decision. Publishing it would seem to prove the Government’s under- standing of the complexities of modern warfare and publicly shown that they were actively planning to save lives. By leaving the public in the dark, it created anxiety over the effects of fallout and showed the Gov- ernment in the worst possible light, giving the impression that lacoste shoes for men they had no answer to the questions posed by fallout. By the time the pamphlet was published in 1959,lacoste sneakers the opportunity to shape public opinion on this issue had been lost.